Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 5 / 2011 (558)
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
University of Oradea
Marcel Ioan BOLOŞ
University of Oradea
Cristian Ioan OTGON
University of Oradea
Abstract. Auctions purchases represent an effective mechanism for public authorities, designed to provide the buyer (public authority), products and services with a convenient time to complete the transaction and the option to set a minimum price. In this paper we will study the problem of the optimal public expenditure rules using Bayes-Nash equilibrium in an symmetrical auction with knowledge of independent value, meaning each bidder knows only his own information. After setting the function for optimum balance to profit for the bidders by minimizing this function (the derivation of I order) and maximize it (the derivation of II order), it has to identify the optimal range where the offer of a bidder for products and services will stand.
Contents
Model for the Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Banking Supervision Activity
The State and the Economy – Theoretical Aspects and Empirical Evidence for the EU
Fiat versus Representative Money under Debate, or How Right Keynes Was Once (!)
Education and Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Some Evidence from Senegal
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and Game Theory in Public Expenditure Management
The Economic Crisis and Several Effects on Global Economy
Tourism as a Factor in Economic Recovery
Economic Science and Postmodernism: Ethics Return
Romanian Economic Environment Entrepreneurial Activities Analysis and Risk Evaluation
Transylvania – Romanian Tourism Micro-destination
The Crisis of Economic Theory in the Middle of the Economic Crisis