Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 5 / 2012 (570)
Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Abstract. In the paper we discuss the optimal labor agreements between workers and firms in the situation of asymmetric information. Using a standard adverse selection model, we analyze the optimality of the labor contracts when it is the firm which has private information affecting the results of the contractual relationship. We propose an alternative procedure to solve the optimization problem, using the informational rents as variables. In the last part of the paper we derive and comment the features of the optimal labor contracts in asymmetric information.
Contents
Optimal Labor Contracts with Asymmetric Information and More than Two Types of Agent
Inflation Targeting in the Romanian Banking Brushwood
Oligarchy versus Democracy and Regulation versus Deregulation under the Globalization Effect
Using Garch-in-Mean Model to Investigate Volatility and Persistence at Different Frequencies for Bucharest Stock Exchange during 1997-2012
Preparation of Financial Statements for Sme’s in Romania. Interest for Cash-Flow Statement
The Biblical Matrix of Economics
The Sustainable Development Model
Comportamentul financiar al populaţiei în timpul crizei
Education and Crisis
The Post-Crisis Healthcare System: Effects of the Economic Crisis in Romania
Business Incubators – Favorable Environment for Small and Medium Enterprises Development
Procedural and Systematic Crisis Approach and Crisis Management