Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 6 / 2011 (559)
Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Abstract. In the paper we analyse a model for determining the optimal licensing contract in both situations of symmetric and asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. Next we present another way of solving the corresponding adverse selection model, using the informational rents as variables. This approach is different from that of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo.
Contents
The Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings on the Issuance of Government Bonds in Central and Eastern Europe
Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents
Morality, Ethics and True Image in Business Accounting
Intra-Industry Trade in Tourism Services
Operational Risk Modeling
Trends in Trade and Investment Flows between the EU and the BRIC Countries
The Evaluation of the Competitiveness State of Manufacturing Companies in Romania – an Approach According to Mereuţă Model
The Birth of the Regulated Company in the Macroeconomic Environment
FDI in the Service Sector – Propagator of Growth for India?
The Economic Theory and the Global Crisis, between Theoretical Solutions and the Economic Reality