Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 11 / 2008 (528)
The Impossibility of a Paretian Libertarian: a Solution through the Imposition of a Rationality Condition on Individual Preferences on Conjunct Alternatives
National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest
Abstract. In this article I present the Impossibility of a Paretian Libertarian theorem (Sen) and I discuss its significance with regard to the problem of externalities. I introduce two conditions for the selection of an “acceptable” solution for this impossibility result: efficacy for real societies and ideological fidelity. I present Hillinger-Lapham, Gibbard, Blau and Saari solutions and I classify them according to the two conditions mentioned above. I extend the social choice literature by introducing a new solution consisting in a reformulation of the libertarian at the minimal-rational libertarian preferences. In this formulation the only relevant kind of preferences are those that are “minimal-rational libertarian”. This solution satisfies both the efficacity for real societies and the ideological fidelity conditions.
Contents
Towards a Comprehensive Policy on Entrepreneurship Education in the European Higher Education
The Labour Mobility in the European Union: Economic and Social Determinants
The Impact of Trades on Daily Volatility: an Empirical Study for Romanian Financial Investments Funds
The Impossibility of a Paretian Libertarian: a Solution through the Imposition of a Rationality Condition on Individual Preferences on Conjunct Alternatives
Application of Discriminant Analysis on Romanian Insurance Market
Environment Protection and Implementation of its Policies in Romania
An Analysis of the Romanian General Accounting Plan. Opportunities for Adaptation to the Activity-Based Costing (ABC) Method
Productivity and Performance through Marketing Planning