Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 4 / 2022 (633), Winter
Cost structures, technology levels and collusion
National Law University, Delhi, India
Abstract. We analyze the role of technology levels in collusion and welfare in Cournot duopoly set up with a linear demand and quadratic costs. We show that for relatively inefficient technologies, the collusive profit is dominated by the Cournot-Nash profit; thus, the firms with not-so good technologies would not collude. We also show that as technology improves, the collusive profit dominates the Cournot-Nash profit, which creates an incentive for collusion, i.e., innovation would lead to collusion. We also show that, for very good/bad technology, innovation would not be anticonsumers’ welfare, whereas for the intermediate one, it may be.
Contents
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The nexus between global oil prices and Islamic and conventional stock markets in the developed and developing countries
American bilateral trade with emerging economies and its influence on world economic recovery post Covid-19: Analysis through VECM
Energy poverty and the vulnerable energy consumer in Romania: A curious case of policy schizophrenia
Transitions into self-employment in European Union and Israel: Field study
A cross country analysis of components of economic growth through the growth accounting approach
Financial liberalization and economic growth: The case of Algeria
Financial inclusion in sub-Saharan Africa: Benchmarking against peer developing countries
Cointegration and stock market interdependence: Evidence from India and selected Asian and African stock markets
Government subsidies and income inequality in Algeria: An analytical and empirical study
An analysis of the effect of widespread unemployment on corruption
The Russia-Ukraine invasion toward increasing food security threat for population: An empirical study using T-GARCH model
Energy consumption and economic growth nexus in Africa: New insights from emerging economies
Two conditions which induce Giffen behavior in any numerical analysis if applied to the Wold-Juréen (1953) utility function
How large is the size of Côte d'Ivoire's informal sector? A MIMIC approach
Portfolio construction and performance evaluation: Evidence from India and Iran
Cost structures, technology levels and collusion
The trend of the economic evolution in Romania in the context of crises