Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 11 / 2014 (600)
Ontological constraints on rational irrationality: the case of electoral preferences
National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, Romania
Abstract. This paper is concerned with Caplan’s (2000, 2001, 2006) rational irrationality model and its application on electoral preference formation. According to this model, individuals consume irrationality in a rational manner i.e. they maximize their total welfare through an exchange between their material and psychological welfare. Using the contributions of an important debate from the philosophy of economics regarding the imposition of ontological constraints on models, unrealistic assumptions and explanatory unification, two arguments are formulated: First, Caplan’s model is ontologically bewildered – it contains opposed statements about the psychological descriptiveness of rational irrationality. Second, even though Caplan is apparently aware of the tension between ontological and tractability considerations he seems to privilege the latter.
Contents
Enhancing the capacity for innovation of public administration. An exploratory study on e-Governance, ICT, knowledge management in Romania
Exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves in Turkey: nonlinear and frequency domain causality approach
The challenges of accounting profession as generated by controlling
A cross-country comparison of the personal income tax systems progressivity
Covered bonds vs. assets securitization
A mark-up model of inflation for Morocco
Economic benefits of the infrastructure projects implemented in the Reservation of the Danube Delta Biosphere
Ontological constraints on rational irrationality: the case of electoral preferences
Relationship between the misalignment of the real exchange rate and capital flight in the developing countries
The leadership role of a local public administration CIO: the case of Bucharest