Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 10 / 2011 (563)
Optimal Licensing Contracts with Three Innovation Types
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Abstract. In the paper we analyze the features of the optimal licensing contracts in the situation of asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. The approach is based on a classical model of adverse selection first proposed by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991) and solved in an alternative way, using the informational rents as variables, by Marinescu and Marin (2011). Their model is extended in the present paper by assuming that the adverse selection parameter can have one of three possible values (corresponding to three possible types of innovations).
Contents
Optimal Licensing Contracts with Three Innovation Types
Novelties in Competition Regulation in Romania. Impact on Competitors
A Cause and Effect Analysis of University – Business Cooperation for Regional Innovation in Romania
Moldavia and Maramureş – Micro-destinations for Relaunching the Romanian Tourism
Corporate Social Responsibility – between Desideratum and Reality
Identification of Critical Points in the Quality Management System
Econometric Modeling of GDP Time Series
Impact of Institutional Credit on Agricultural Output: A Case Study of Pakistan
The Management of Waste Containing Asbestos in Romania and the European Union
Technological Innovation: Concept, Process, Typology and Implications in the Economy